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Abstract
Fee-based membership free shipping is an important
shipping fee schedule in E-Commerce. This paper studies
how the membership free shipping (MFS) program affects
firm competition and how to set the membership fee op-
timally. We find MFS relaxes price competition. The firm
that adopts MFS has a higher pricing band than the other
firm. Both firms have positive profits, strictly better than
when membership free shipping is not a choice. The MFS
firm subsidizes subscribers, so the subscribers always have a
lower average total cost (price plus shipping fee) per order.
The MFS firm could still earn a higher profit than the other
firm, although the MFS firm’s profit excluding membership
fee is lower than that of the other firm. The paper also
characterizes how to set the optimal membership fee and
shows that an intermediate percentage of subscribers is
optimal for the firm that adopts the free shipping program.
1. Introduction
Shipping charges are an important element in E-
Commerce. Due to the razor-thin margin of e-tailing, ship-
ping charges often become the make-or-break factor of an e-
business. E-commerce companies have been using a variety
of shipping fee schedules, such as free shipping, flat rate
per order, or free shipping when orders are above a given
threshold. In recent years, the e-commerce industry has seen
a growing interest with membership free shipping (MFS).
Consumers who subscribe to MFS need to prepay an annual
membership fee, and enjoy free shipping for any order of
most product categories, along with other benefits, such
as free return ship, and cash back. Amazon Prime is the
world’s largest MFS program, which charges a $99 annual
fee and provides its subscribers a free two-day shipping over
selected Prime items. According to a survey conducted in
late 2015, Amazon may have up to 50 million U.S. Prime
subscribers.
Though MFS is thought as a loyalty program to keep
consumers. Its cost is rather high. Since consumers self-
select to subscribe to MFS, consumers who shop more are
more willing to adopt MFS. Thus MFS providers heavily
subsidize their customers. It is estimated that Amazon lost
at least $11 for each subscriber (Tuttle (2011)). In the fourth
quarter of 2015, Amazon’s overall shipping costs shot up to
$1.8 billion, at a speed far out-pacing its revenue growth
(Rubin (2016)).
Some argue for MFS on other grounds. Rogowsky
(2014) reports that Amazon Prime changes the way people
shop and makes Amazon the default shopping destination
of its subscribers. Lewis (2006) and Lewis, Singh, and Fay
(2006) find free-shipping increases retention rate, greatly
increases order incidence rates but leads to smaller order
amounts. However they also find the lost revenues from
shipping may make firms unprofitable. Tan, Ho, and Tan
(2015) compares MFS with contingent free shipping, a tra-
ditional shipping schedule in which consumers are eligible
for free shipping when the order size reaches a threshold.
They model shipping schedules as bundled services and are
sources of horizontal product differentiation. By providing
a higher value to consumers, retailers gain more profit.
This paper intends to show that despite its high cost and
besides aforementioned benefits, MFS relaxes competition
and makes all firms better off. This paper also answers
questions like what is the optimal membership fee and what
is the percentage of subscribers.
We model a duopoly with one firm being the pioneer
who adopts MFS. Consumers differ in number of orders
per year. The firms would play a Bertrand pricing game
and earn zero profit when MFS is unavailable. With MFS,
the duopoly will charge different pricing strategies, with
the firm with MFS having a higher pricing band than the
other firm. Both firms have positive profits. The MFS firm
subsidizes the subscribers, so the subscribers always have a
lower average total cost (price plus shipping fee) per order.
Nevertheless, it still earns a higher profit than the other
one. We characterize how to set the optimal membership
fee and show that an intermediate percentage of subscribers
is optimal for the MFS firm.
This paper contributes to the emerging research on MFS
and is related to quantity discount and loyalty program liter-
ature. Quantity discount is a widely studied nonlinear price
schedule and is a mechanism to achieve price discrimination
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against certain consumers or to influence buyers’ ordering
pattern (Buchanen (1953), Dolan (1987)). There is a key
difference between this paper and a typical quantity discount
setting. In the setting of this paper, subscribers (consumers
who have higher number of orders per year) do have a
lower average shipping cost per order, but offering MFS is
always suboptimal for a monopolist, thus never used, while
quantity discount is frequently used for monpolistic price
discrimination. MFS improves profit only in a competitive
setting. Besides, subscribers are not obliged to purchase
from the MFS firm, and they may switch to the other firm
if it offers a lower total cost. Also in this paper, buyers’
ordering pattern is unchanged because of MFS.
Most of the existing research on loyalty programs em-
phasizes free programs and post-enrollment outcomes. There
are few research on fee-based loyalty programs. Ashley,
Gillespie, and Noble (2015) studies how loyalty program
fees change consumer perceptions and how the loyalty pro-
gram structure interacts with loyalty program fees to affect
customer engagement. This paper contributes to this line
research by providing a theoretical framework studying the
interaction between fee setting and other important market-
ing variable, i.e, pricing, and how the program might affect
firm competition.
2. Model
We consider two firms selling the same products. This
paper discusses the case that only one firm offers MFS
program, which captures the reality that only a few etailers
offer MFS. We will leave the case both firms offering MFS
to future study. Firm 1 is the pioneer that provides an MFS
program for consumers to enroll in. The MFS program’s
annual membership fee is k. Subscribers of the program can
enjoy free shipping for a year. Firm 1 affords the shipping
cost for MFS subscribers. Both firms also offer the standard
shipping charge policy: a fixed shipping fee f per order. We
assume firms do not make money on shipping. The shipping
fee, f is used exactly to cover the shipping cost, which is
also f . Note a MFS subscriber can still buy from firm 2 if it
yields higher surplus for her. The product cost is normalized
to zero.
The total consumer population is normalized to 1. We
assume consumers differ in the number of orders per year,
which is represented by variable x and x is a random
variable associated with p.d.f. g(x) and c.d.f. G(x), x, x ∈
(0, x). This consumer heterogeneity is a prerequisite for an
MFS program: if all consumers have an equal number of
orders per year, the MFS membership fee will be the total
shipping fees in a year and all consumers will be indifferent
between joining the program or not. Lewis (2006) and Lewis
et al. (2006) empirically test how free-shipping programs
affect order basket size. This effect is not the focus of
this paper. So we assume each consumer only buys one
product per order. We assume consumers’ willingness to pay
is sufficiently high, so it will not restrict retailers’ pricing.
The game plays out in the following sequence:
1) firm 1 set the MFS membership fee k;
2) having observed k, consumers decide whether to
join the free-shipping program;
3) firms set prices pi, i = 1, 2 simultaneously and
independently;
4) having observed both prices, consumers choose
between two firms.
We shall solve the game using backward induction.
3. Analysis
3.1. Stage 4: consumer choice
Consumers choose the firm that gives them higher sur-
plus. There are two types of consumers: MFS subscribers
and non-subscribers. For a subscriber, k is a sunken cost.
She will buy from retailer 1 if p1 < p2 + f , and from firm
2 if p1 > p2 + f , and from either retailer with equal chance
if p1 = p2 + f .
A non-subscriber needs to pay shipping cost f to either
firm. So she will buy from the firm with a lower price and
from either one with equal chance if prices are equal.
3.2. Stage 3: pricing strategies
Clearly consumers with higher x enjoy greater saving
from shipping charges. Assume x∗ is the marginal consumer
that is indifferent between subscribe MFS or not. Then
consumer x, x > x∗, must prefer to subscribe the MFS and
consumer x, x < x∗ must prefer not to subscribe. Therefore
the number of subscribers is 1−G(x∗) and that of the non-
subscribers is G(x∗).
Denote the total orders made by non-subscribers by
a, a =
∫ x∗
0
tg(t)dt. Denote the total orders made by all
consumers by b, b =
∫ x
0
tg(t)dt. Assume the consumers only
purchase one unit product per order. a and b−a are the total
units made by non-subscribers and subscribers respectively.
The firms’ objective is to find their profit-maximizing
pricing strategies. It is obvious that the pricing game does
not have a pure-strategy equilibrium. We now turn to char-
acterize a mixed-strategy pricing equilibrium.
Assume the pricing strategy of firm i is characterized by
a cumulative distribution Fi(x). We can prove that Fi(x) is
continuous and atomless, the length of the support of Fi is
f , and the supports of F1(x) and F2(x) have an non-empty
overlap 1.
So given strategy F2(p), if retailer 1 sets price at p,
• with probability F2(p)− F2(p− f), the subscribers
purchase from retailer 1 and non-subscribers pur-
chase from retailer 2;
• with probability 1− F2(p): all consumers purchase
from retailer 1;
• with probability F2(p− f): all consumers purchase
from retailer 2.
1. The proof is omitted here, which is similar to the one in Jing and
Wen (2008).
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Firm 1 receives membership fee k(1−G(x∗)) from sub-
scribers. Taking consideration of above probabilistic events,
firm 1 receives profit (p− f)(b− a) from subscribers with
probability F2(p)−F2(p−f)+1−F2(p) = 1−F2(p−f) and
profit pa from non-subscribers with probability 1 − F2(p).
Therefore Firm 1’s expected profit from charging price p is:
Π1(p) =(p− f)(b− a)(1− F2(p− f))+
pa(1− F2(p)) + k(1−G(x∗)). (1)
Given strategy F1(p), if retailer 2 sets price at p,
• with probability F1(p+ f)− F1(p), the subscribers
purchase from retailer 1 and non-subscribers pur-
chase from retailer 2;
• with probability 1 − F1(p + f): all consumers pur-
chase from retailer 2;
• with probability F1(p): all consumers purchase from
retailer 1.
Taking consideration of above probabilistic events, firm
2 receives profit pa from only non-subscribers of firm 1
with probability F1(p + f) − F1(p) and profit pb from all
consumers with probability 1 − F1(p + f). Therefore firm
2’s expected profit from charging price p is:
Π2(p) = pa(F1(p+ f)−F1(p)) + pb(1−F1(p+ f)). (2)
Denote firm i’s equilibrium strategy by F ∗i (p) and the
equilibrium profit by pii. Firm i achieves pii when it charges
a price p in its support, given its opponent charges strategy
F ∗j (p), j 6= i, that is Πi(p;F ∗j (p)) = pii.
By the equilibrium condition, we derive the equilibrium
strategy as follows.
Proposition 1. There is a unique mixed-strategy equilib-
rium:
F ∗1 (p) =
{
1− pi2ap pi2a ≤ p < pi1−k(1−G(x
∗))
b−a + f
1
b−a
[
b− pi2p−f
]
pi1−k(1−G(x∗))
b−a + f ≤ p ≤ pi2a + f
,
(3)
F ∗2 (p) =

1− pi1−k(1−G(x∗))(b−a)p
, pi1−k(1−G(x
∗))
b−a ≤ p < pi2a
1
a
[
b− pi1−k(1−G(x∗))+f(b−a)p
]
, pi2a ≤ p ≤ pi1−k(1−G(x
∗))
b−a + f
, (4)
where pi1 = b−a2
( − 1 + √ −a2+ab+b23a2−3ab+b2 )f + k(1 − G(x∗))
and pi2 = a2(b−a)
(
b− (2a− b)
√
−a2+ab+b2
3a2−3ab+b2
)
f .
Proposition 1 shows that the pricing band of firm 1 is
always higher than that of firm 2, and both firms enjoy
positive profits. Note before firm 1 introduces MFS, the
firms play a Bertrand game and earn zero profit. Therefore
MFS relaxes price competition and benefits all firms.
Corollary 2. Firm 1 has a higher pricing band than firm 2.
Introducing MFS relaxes price competition, resulting higher
profits than without MFS.
Proposition 1 shows that the subscribers do not always
buy from firm 1. When the price of firm 2 is low enough
(p2 ∈ (pi1−k(1−G(x
∗))
b−a ,
pi2
a )), there is a positive probability
that the subscribers buy from firm 2.
Note the non-subscribers who buy from firm 1 pay p1 +
f , while the subscribers only pay p1, who always have lower
total purchase costs.
It is easy to verify pi1 − k(1−G(x∗)) < pi2 for any a,
which suggests the following result.
Corollary 3. Firm 1’s profit, before adding the MFS mem-
bership fee, is lower than that of firm 2.
3.3. Stage 2: MFS subscription decision
Consider the marginal consumer x∗, who is indifferent
between joining MFS or not. If she subscribes to MFS,
she needs to pay the membership fee k. Her purchase cost
depends on from which firm she will purchase from. If
p1 ∈ (pi2a , pi1−k(1−G(x
∗))
b−a + f ), the price difference between
two firms is not large, so the consumer will always buy from
firm 1. If p1 ∈ (pi1−k(1−G(x
∗))
b−a +f,
pi2
a +f), she will compare
p1 with p2 + f and choose the lower price. Therefore her
expected total payout is
x∗
(∫ pi2
a
pi1−k(1−G(x∗))
b−a
(p+ f)f∗2 (p)(1− F ∗1 (p+ f))dp∫ pi1−k(1−G(x∗))
b−a +f
pi2
a
pf∗1 (p)dp+∫ pi2
a +f
pi1−k(1−G(x∗))
b−a +f
pf∗1 (p)(1− F ∗2 (p− f))dp
)
+ k. (5)
If she does not subscribe to MFS, she always needs
to pay the shipping fee f no matter from which firm she
purchases, so she always chooses the lower price between
the two firms. Her expected total payout is
x∗
(∫ pi2
a
pi1−k(1−G(x∗))
b−a
(p+ f)f∗2 (p)dp+∫ pi1−k(1−G(x∗))
b−a +f
pi2
a
(p+ f)
(
f∗1 (p)(1− F ∗2 (p))+
(1− F ∗1 (p)f∗2 (p)
)
dp
)
. (6)
Equating above two equations, we can find the marginal
consumer x∗(k).
3.4. Stage 1: membership fee
Now firm 1 considers how to set an optimal k to max-
imize its profit. If k = 0, all consumers will subscribe, so
a = b. By proposition 1, pi1 = pi2 = 0. If k is too large
so that no consumers subscribe, both firms will engage a
Bertrand pricing game to attract consumers, and each will
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earn profit zero. Thus an intermediate k yields a higher
profit.
Firm 1’s problem is
max
k
pi1(k), s. t. a =
∫ x∗(k)
0
tg(t)dt (7)
Clearly this problem does not have an analytical so-
lution. We may show the solution with numerical exper-
iments. Assume x follows a uniform distribution, e.g.,
x = 1, g(x) = 1 and G(x) = x, and f = 1. Then
b =
∫ x
0
tg(t)dt = 0.5 and a = x
∗2(k)
2 .
By numerical methods, we find the marginal consumer
x∗ = 0.645, a = 0.208 and k∗ = 0.413. Note the average
number of orders per consumer per year is 0.5. so 0.413 is
about 80% an average consumer would pay for the yearly
total shipping cost. The subscribers are 35.5% of the total
population, and account for about 80% of total orders.
The firms’ profits are pi1 = 0.313 and pi2 = 0.242. Firm
1 earns a higher profit than firm 2. The membership fee
income is 0.147, which is about 47% of firm 1’s total profit.
This example shows that if firm 1 sets the membership fee
smartly, its total profit could be higher than that of the other
firm.
Corollary 4. Firm 1’s total profit could be higher than that
of firm 2, even if its before membership fee-income profit is
lower than that of firm 2.
4. Summary
In this paper, we are interested in the role membership
free shipping plays in affecting competition and how to set
the membership fee optimally. We model an asymmetric
duopoly with one firm being the pioneer who adopts MFS.
Consumers differ in number of orders per year. We show
the duopoly will charge different pricing strategies, with
the firm with MFS having a higher pricing band than the
other firm. Both firms have positive profits. Consumers with
higher number of orders per year self-select to subscribe
to MFS and always have a lower average total cost per
order than other consumers. Despite having to subsidize the
subscribers, the MFS firm could still earn a higher profit
than the other firm, though the MFS firm’s profit excluding
membership fees is lower than that of the other firm. The
paper also characterizes how to set the optimal membership
fee and shows that an intermediate percentage of subscribers
is optimal.
This paper provides a basic model that could be extended
in multiple ways. Firstly we could consider both firms opt to
adopt MFS and competitively set member fees; secondly the
model may take into the consideration that non-subscribers
may bundle orders to save shipping fees; thirdly search costs
may play an important role when subscribers deem the MFS
firm the default search starting point.
Appendix
Proof. Suppose the support of F ∗i (p) is Pi and the upper
and the lower bound of Pi are Pi and Pi. Previously we
show Pi= Pi + f . By the condition F ∗i (Pi) = 0, we find
P1 =
pi2
α and P2 =
pi1−k(1−G(x∗))
b−a .
When P1 < p < P2 + f , by the equilibrium condition
pi1 = Π1(p) = (p − f)(b − a)F ∗2 (p) + (p − f)(b − a)(1 −
F ∗2 (p)) + pa(1 − F ∗2 (p)) + k(1 − G(x∗)), so F ∗2 (p) =
1
a
[
b− pi1−k(1−G(x∗))+f(b−a)p
]
.
When P2 + f < p < P1, only the subscribers pur-
chase from firm 1. By the equilibrium condition pi1 =
Π1(p) = (p − f)(b − a)(1 − F ∗2 (p − f)) + k(1 − G(x∗)),
so F ∗2 (p) =
1
a
[
b− pi1−k(1−G(x∗))+f(b−a)p
]
, and F ∗2 (p −
f) = 1 − pi1−k(1−G(x∗))(b−a)(p−f) . Therefore we have F ∗2 (p) =
1− pi1−k(1−G(x∗))(b−a)p for P2 < p < P1 − f .
Since F ∗2 (p) is continuous, F
∗
2 (P1)
− = F ∗2 (P1)
+, from
which we find pi1 as stated in the proposition.
When P1 < p < P2 + f , only the non-subscribers
purchase from firm 2. By the equilibrium condition pi2 =
Π2(p) = pa(1− F ∗1 (p)), so F ∗1 (p) = 1− pi2ap .
When P2 < p < P1, by the equilibrium condition pi2 =
Π2(p) = paF
∗
1 (p+f)+pb(1−F ∗1 (p+f)), so F ∗1 (p+f) =
1
b−a
[
b− pi2p
]
. Therefore we have F ∗1 (p) =
1
b−a
[
b− pi2p−f
]
for P2 < p < P1.
Since F ∗1 (p) is continuous, F
∗
1 (P2)
− = F ∗1 (P2)
+, from
which we find pi2 as stated in the proposition.
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